



The article I am commenting on, “Libertarianism and the Phil-osophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios,” represents asignificant turn in David Widerker’s thinking about moral
responsibility, or, more precisely, moral blameworthiness.1 He now
holds that an agent can be morally blameworthy for an action of
his even if it was not within his power to avoid performing it. This
“avoidability-independent account of moral blame,” as Widerker calls
it, contrasts with his previous defense of avoidability as a require-
ment of moral responsibility. The article contains deep insights and
a lot of good argument. My purpose in this comment, however, is
mainly critical. After a brief presentation of Widerker’s new posi-
tion, I will state why I do not find it convincing.
In an important and influential article,2 Widerker put forward a
powerful defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP)
against criticisms based on so-called Frankfurt-style examples or Frank-
furt scenarios. According to PAP, in Widerker’s recent formulation,
“[a]n agent S is morally blameworthy for performing a given act V
only if he could have avoided performing it” (163).3 Frankfurt sce-
narios are cases in which an agent, fully on his own, does something
which he would have been caused to do anyway by an alien factor
had he shown some sign that he was not going to do it on his own.
* This paper falls under the research project “Belief, Responsibility, and Action”
(HUM2006-04907), awarded and supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education
and Science, to which thanks are due. Let me also thank Milagro Garrido, Tobies
Grimaltos, Javi Hernandez, Marta Moreno, Eduardo Ortiz, Sergi Rosell, and Lino San
Juan for useful comments on previous versions of this paper.
1 Widerker, “Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Sce-
narios,” this journal, ciii, 4 (April 2006): 163–87.
2 Widerker, “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternate
Possibilities,” Philosophical Review, civ, 2 (1995): 247–61.
3 Harry Frankfurt’s formulation of PAP was as follows: “A person is morally respon-
sible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise” (“Alternate Pos-
sibilities and Moral Responsibility,” this journal, lxvi, 23 (December 4, 1969): 829–39,
on p. 829). Widerker’s formulation is more general, in that an alternative to perform-
ing a given action can be just to avoid performing it, and not necessarily to perform a
different action. It is plausible to think that this was the spirit of Frankfurt’s formula-
tion as well.
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If cases of this sort are to imply the falsity of PAP, they have to satisfy
at least two conditions. First, the circumstances that make the act
unavoidable for the agent should not cause the agent to perform it.
Widerker calls this condition IRR.4 Here is Widerker’s own formu-
lation: “(IRR) There may be circumstances that in no way bring it
about that a person performs a certain action; nevertheless, those
very circumstances make it impossible for him to avoid performing
that action” (164). A second condition is, of course, that the agent
in such scenarios is morally responsible for his act. If at least one
Frankfurt-style example meets these conditions, we have a case in
which an agent is morally responsible for something he does even
if he could not have avoided doing it, and PAP is then false.5 A ra-
tionale for condition IRR is that, if the act is unavoidable owing to
circumstances that causally necessitate it, then the judgment that the
agent is morally responsible for his act becomes unstable, and satis-
faction of the second condition is jeopardized. Indeed, if that is the
case, incompatibilists will (understandably enough) refuse to accept
the agent’s moral responsibility. But even compatibilists may hesi-
tate for, depending on the nature of the circumstances that causally
necessitate the action, it may appear as forced, coerced, or otherwise
not freely performed.
Widerker contended that Frankfurt scenarios do not satisfy the
IRR condition for choices or decisions, which are the natural loci of
moral responsibility for libertarians. His argument for this conten-
tion took the form of a dilemma.6 For simplicity, suppose that the
alien, inactive, though lurking factor in Frankfurt scenarios is an
agent, Black. Think of the sign that Black employs for not inter-
vening in the agent’s (call him Jones) spontaneous process of de-
liberation and decision. Now, this is the dilemma. Either this sign
is causally sufficient for Jones’s decision, or it is not. If it is, then
condition IRR is not satisfied, for the decision is made unavoidable
by circumstances that causally determine it. If it is not, so that the
sign is only a more or less reliable indicator of Jones’s future deci-
sion, then there is no reason to think that the decision is unavoid-
able, and condition IRR is violated again. In either case, PAP is not
refuted. On the first horn, there are no alternatives for Jones’s deci-
4 I have not been able to ascertain why he calls it this.
5 In my recent book Moral Responsibility: The Ways of Scepticism (New York: Routledge,
2006), chapter 2, I have extensively defended PAP against Frankfurt-inspired and other
criticisms of it. In the present paper I defend PAP further against Widerker’s criticism.
6 Cf. Widerker, “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternate
Possibilities,” pp. 251–56.
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sion, but he is not (for incompatibilists, at least) morally responsible
for it. On the second horn, Jones may be morally responsible for
his decision, but it certainly seems that he had alternatives to it: he
could have decided otherwise, or at least could have avoided the deci-
sion he actually made.7
As Widerker writes: “The worry behind the dilemma objection is
understandable. If in an IRR-situation the agent’s decision is not
causally determined, then why is it not within the agent’s power to
refrain from it?” (166). Since Widerker’s forceful presentation, the
dilemma defense has exerted strong pressure on the construction of
prima facie plausible Frankfurt scenarios. Widerker holds that none
of the attempts to design such scenarios in response to the dilemma
defense has been successful. However, unlike what he used to think,
he now contends that IRR-situations are nonetheless possible: “In
the past, I have been skeptical about the prospects of providing a
successful example of an IRR-situation. Since then, however, I have
come to believe that such situations are conceptually possible” (166).
Let us see the way in which Widerker has tried to show the possibility
of these situations.
A chief difficulty in conceiving of IRR-situations is that it does
not seem possible to reconcile the fact that the decision (or action) is
not causally determined with its unavoidability. In an indeterminis-
tic setting, alternative pathways of some sort are bound to be present,
and in some of these alternative pathways the decision is not made
or the action is not performed. In fact, Widerker does not actually
solve this difficulty. As we will see, his purported examples of IRR-
situations are not such that in them the agent’s decision is strictly
unavoidable. However, Widerker resorts to a thesis that has emerged
from the discussion about Frankfurt scenarios, namely, that it is
not strictly necessary, for a situation to count as a counterexample
to PAP, that in it the agent’s decision is actually unavoidable. It is
enough that the alternative pathways that may be present in it,
which may include the agent’s not making the decision he actually
makes, are not within the agent’s power or control; it is enough,
in Widerker’s terms, that they are not “actionally accessible” to the
agent: “Call a state of affairs (event) E actionally accessible for an agent
S, relative to a time T, if and only if S has it within his power at T to
bring about E” (167).
7 A related defense of PAP was put forward by Robert Kane in his Free Will and Values
(Albany: SUNY, 1985). However, it was Widerker’s forceful presentation of it that
brought this strategy to the center of the discussion about PAP and Frankfurt-style ob-
jections to it.
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Alternatives that are only causally possible,8 but not actionally ac-
cessible, to an agent do not suffice to defend PAP against counter-
examples. To see why, imagine that, in a Frankfurt scenario, an agent
deliberates competently and, on the basis of his own reasons, makes a
morally wrong decision. Suppose that this decision is avoidable only
as follows: before making it, the agent might, inadvertently and invol-
untarily, have stumbled on a stone and got hurt, with the result that
he would have stopped deliberating and not have made the decision
he actually made. If, in this example, the agent is morally responsible
for his decision, it does not seem that such an alternative has anything
to do with his responsibility: this alternative is not morally significant.
Actional accessibility is a necessary condition for an alternative to be
morally significant or, to use John Martin Fischer’s well-known term, to
be robust enough to explain the agent’s moral responsibility.9 So, ac-
tionally inaccessible alternatives cannot be legitimately pointed to in
order to vindicate PAP against putative counterexamples.
On the basis of the preceding remarks, we can understand
Widerker’s strategy. It consists in constructing examples where the
agent’s decision is not causally determined, but where the alterna-
tives that are left, though causally possible, are not actionally acces-
sible to the agent (and so not morally significant or robust). Strictly
speaking, then, these are not properly IRR-situations, for the agent’s
decision is not unavoidable. They are, however, examples of a more
general notion that includes the original IRR-situations as particu-
lar cases of it. Widerker calls this more general notion or condition
G-IRR: “There may be circumstances that in no way bring it about
that a person performs a certain action; nevertheless those very cir-
cumstances leave him with no morally significant alternative to per-
forming that action” (175). Notice that having no alternative to what
one does is a particular way of having no morally significant alter-
native to it. Corresponding to this more general definition of an
IRR-situation, Widerker suggests the following more general for-
mulation of PAP: “An agent S is morally blameworthy for V-ing at T
only if S had a morally significant alternative to V-ing at T ” (175, note
24). It is plausible to think that this formulation is faithful to the
8 Widerker defines a causally possible state of affairs E, relative to a time T, as fol-
lows: “E obtains in some possible world W that up until (and including) T has the same
history and the same laws of nature as the actual world” (167).
9 It was Fischer, in fact, who first pressed this point, according to which alternative
possibilities in Frankfurt scenarios have to be robust, in the sense of being explanato-
rily relevant for the agent’s moral responsibility, if resort to them is to be successful as
a defense of PAP. Cf. Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994),
pp. 140–47.
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original inspiration of PAP: alternative possibilities mentioned in
this principle are plausibly taken to be morally significant or robust.
Strictly speaking, then, the scenarios Widerker depicts are examples
of G-IRR-situations, rather than of IRR-situations, and they are pur-
ported counterexamples to the general formulation of PAP, rather
than to the original formulation of it. Having this in mind, how-
ever, we shall use “IRR-situations” to refer to G-IRR-situations (which,
of course, include IRR-situations proper), and with “PAP” we will
refer to the general formulation of this principle we have just in-
dicated. Let us now have a look at Widerker’s purported examples
of IRR-situations.
Widerker depicts his IRR-situations on the basis of an initial ex-
ample of a Frankfurt scenario, which he dubs “Promise Breaking.”
The example features Jones, who has promised his uncle to visit him
in the hospital before an important operation that the old man will
undergo early next morning. On his way to the hospital, Jones meets
Mary, a former girlfriend of his, whom he has not seen for a long
time. Mary tells Jones that she will be in town for just a couple of
hours and that she would most like to spend those hours with him.
Jones feels strongly attracted by Mary’s proposal. He knows, how-
ever, that, if he accepts it, he will not be able to keep the promise
he made to his uncle, for the visit time will be over. So he deliberates
whether to keep his promise. Unbeknownst to him, however, another
person, Black, wants Jones to break that promise and has the means
to ensure this result. However, Black will remain fully inactive unless
Jones shows a sign that he will finally decide to keep his promise.
In fact, Black has no need to intervene, for Jones shows no such sign
and decides on his own to break his promise and to spend time with
Mary (cf. 164).
Widerker contends that this example falls prey to the dilemma
defense and is not an IRR-situation. However, elaborating on this ex-
ample, Widerker constructs two putative examples of IRR-situations.
The first he calls “Z-Persons.” Suppose that there actually are persons
(Z-Persons) who, in morally laden choice situations in which they
feel a strong temptation to act immorally, invariably behave as fol-
lows: either they succumb to the temptation and make the wrong
decision or they lose consciousness, regaining it shortly afterwards.
Widerker writes:
Now suppose that Jones is such a person, and he is in the kind of sit-
uation described in Promise Breaking, except that this time there is no
Black waiting in the wings. Suppose also that Jones does not know that
he is subject to the said behavioral pattern. As things transpire, Jones
decides at time T to break the promise on his own (169).
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Widerker contends that this is an IRR-situation. Jones’s decision to
break his promise is not causally determined. It might not take place.
However, the only alternative to it in which Jones does not make
that decision, namely Jones’s loss of consciousness (assuming that
this is not under Jones’s control), is not actionally accessible to him,
and so is not morally significant (or robust). Jones, then, does not
have it within his power to decide to keep his promise, which would
be a morally significant alternative. Notice also that the example
does not succumb to the dilemma defense, for it does not feature
a counterfactual intervener or a sign of Jones’s future decision con-
cerning which the dilemma could arise.
Widerker’s second example is called “Brain-Malfunction-W.” It
again features Jones’s deciding at time T to break his promise. A
different decision (which would be a morally significant alternative)
is not open to him, for
… shortly before beginning to deliberate, he undergoes a neurological
change as a result of which one of the (neurological) causally necessary
conditions for his deciding otherwise, a condition which we may call
N, does not obtain. Let us also assume that all this is unknown to Jones
(who believes that he can decide to keep his promise), and that N ’s ab-
sence does not affect his deliberation process (170).
Since N is causally necessary for Jones’s decision to keep his promise,
N ’s absence is causally sufficient for Jones’s not deciding to keep his
promise. This absence, however, is not causally sufficient for his (ac-
tual) decision not to keep his promise. This decision might not take
place, but the alternatives to it (for instance, becoming distracted and
temporarily forgetting about his deliberation), though causally possi-
ble, are not actionally accessible to Jones, and so not morally significant.
It seems, then, that we have two examples of an IRR-situation. More
exactly, they are examples of a G-IRR-situation, for, though Jones’s
decision is not, strictly speaking, unavoidable, the alternatives to it
are not morally significant. However, as Widerker himself accepts,
in addition to its being an IRR-situation, an example has to satisfy
a second condition if it is to be a counterexample to PAP, namely
that the agent is morally responsible for what he did. In the pur-
ported examples of IRR-situations featuring Jones, he is to be morally
blameworthy for his decision to break his promise, for otherwise
PAP will remain safe. Now, provisionally leaving aside the question
whether Widerker’s examples are in fact IRR-situations, my criticism
of Widerker’s position will rest crucially on the contention that his
examples do not satisfy the indicated condition of moral blameworthi-
ness. More cautiously, my contention would be that there are fairly
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strong reasons against the judgment that, in the proposed examples,
the agent is morally blameworthy for the decision he makes.
It is quite clear that Widerker believes that, in both of his examples,
Jones is morally blameworthy for breaking his promise. Widerker’s
new, avoidability-independent account of moral blame (AI-BL) takes
the following form:
(AI-BL) An agent S is morally blameworthy for deciding-to-V at time T
if and only if
(i) S decides-to-V at T on his own.
(ii) S decides-to-V at T being aware that doing so is morally wrong.
(iii) S believes that he could have decided otherwise, or believes
that he has no good reason to think that he could not have
decided otherwise.
(iv) S does not think that, in the circumstances, deciding-not-
to-V at T is irrational (180).
It seems that Jones, both in Z-Persons and in Brain-Malfunction-W,
satisfies these four conditions; so, if the account is correct, he is mor-
ally blameworthy for breaking his promise. The account does not
require that the agent be actually able to decide otherwise, but only
that he believe he can do so, and this is something that Jones believes
in both cases, though his belief is false.
As I said earlier, I think there are serious reasons for doubting that
Jones is actually morally blameworthy in either case. Let me place my
criticism in the context of contemporary dialectics concerning moral
responsibility. My objections to Widerker are related to what Fischer
has called “weak reasons-responsiveness,” which he takes to be a re-
quirement for moral responsibility.10 Roughly speaking, in deliberat-
ing and deciding, an agent satisfies weak reasons-responsiveness just
in case, keeping constant the mechanism of deliberation and decision-
making that he employs in the situation at hand, there are some pos-
sible scenarios or possible worlds in which there is a sufficient reason
to decide and do otherwise, he recognizes that reason and decides
and does otherwise. It is very plausible that something like this con-
dition is necessary for moral responsibility. Think of someone (the
example is Fischer’s) who decides to steal a book and does so. Fischer
writes: “If (given the operation of the actual kind of mechanism) he
would persist in stealing the book even if he knew that by so acting
10 Cf. Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, pp. 166–67. Fischer has slightly modified the
requirement in his book Moral Responsibility and Control (New York: Cambridge, 1998),
coauthored by Mark Ravizza. In this book, Fischer and Ravizza call the modified re-
quirement “moderate reasons-responsiveness.” I will ignore the distinction, for it is not
essential to my argument.
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he would cause himself and his family to be killed, then the actual
mechanism would seem to be inconsistent with holding him morally
responsible for his action.”11 This thief’s mechanism of deliberation
and decision-making is not responsive to reasons; it is a faulty mech-
anism, which compromises the agent’s capacity for rational delibera-
tion and decision-making and undermines the judgment that he is
morally blameworthy for his decision and action. Whether a certain
process satisfies Fischer’s weak reasons-responsiveness depends on the
truth of certain counterfactuals about what the agent would decide and
do if certain conditions were to hold, but it does not require that the
agent has access to the possible worlds where these conditions hold.
It does not assume, then, that moral responsibility for a decision or
action requires that an agent is actually able to decide and do otherwise.
Now, a related condition should hold for the specific case of moral
reasons. Some degree of responsiveness to moral reasons is plausi-
bly taken to be a requirement for moral responsibility. If, keeping
constant the mechanism of deliberation and decision-making that an
agent employs in a particular situation, and supposing that he faces
a temptation to act immorally, he would never decide in a morally
right way, no matter how strong and decisive his moral reasons may
appear to him, it seems that something is wrong with the agent’s
deliberative faculties in this situation. And this stands in the way of
judging him morally blameworthy for his decision. Now, this seems
to be precisely the case with Jones in Widerker’s examples. Let me
argue for this point.
As Fischer’s weak reasons-responsiveness suggests, an important
assumption of the judgment that an agent is morally responsible for
what he decides is, for compatibilists and incompatibilists alike, that
the decision arises out of a normal process of practical deliberation
and decision, which in turn presupposes in the agent a sound capacity
for practical and moral reasoning. This capacity can be impaired in
several ways. One of these ways may be the belief that one does not
have alternative decisions or actions within one’s power. This belief
may temporarily damage the indicated capacity, vitiate the process
of deliberation, and affect one’s moral responsibility. In Widerker’s
account, the third condition rules out this possibility, and we are en-
titled to assume that, in both examples, Jones believes (falsely, as it
happens) that he can decide to keep his promise. But there are other
ways in which the impairment may occur. Being insensitive to moral
reasons (being “morally blind”) is one of them. Widerker’s second
condition seems to rule out this possibility as well. In his examples,
11 Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, p. 167.
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we should assume, it seems, that Jones is sensitive to moral reasons
for keeping his promise. But, beyond being sensitive to moral rea-
sons, an agent with a normal, unimpaired capacity for moral and
practical reasoning and decision-making should also be able to decide
(and possibly act) according to these reasons. And this is an ability
that Jones lacks in both of Widerker’s examples. As Widerker depicts
the cases, the actual apparatus of practical reasoning and decision-
making that Jones employs is such that he is not able to decide as
moral reasons counsel. Deciding to keep his promise is not causally
possible for Jones, and so is not within his power. And if this is the
case, Jones’s capacity for moral deliberation and decision-making is
seriously impaired, so that the judgment that he is morally blame-
worthy for the decision he makes in the circumstances becomes highly
dubious, to say the least. Let me clarify and develop this point.
First of all, I would like to emphasize that my objection to the
judgment that Jones is morally blameworthy for his decision to
break his promise does not rest on the fact that he lacks morally
significant alternative possibilities, for this would clearly beg the very
question at issue. My objection has rather to do with the fact that the
apparatus of deliberation and decision-making that Jones is using in
the actual sequence is abnormal or impaired. In the context of my
objection, the fact that Jones cannot decide to keep his promise,
no matter how strong or decisive the moral reasons for this decision
may appear to him, is only a symptom or a consequence of the faulty
nature of his actual apparatus of practical and moral reasoning.
And it is this faulty nature, and so a feature of the actual sequence,
rather than the lack of robust alternatives, that backs my doubt about
Jones’s blameworthiness.
The sense in which Jones’s actual apparatus of practical and moral
reasoning is faulty can be seen as follows. Consider first Z-Persons.
Imagine that, on his way to the hospital, Jones meets a friend of his
who is a doctor. Jones tells his friend about the operation that his
uncle is about to undergo and he comes to know from his friend
how dangerous and risky the operation is, and how likely it is that his
uncle will not survive it. We may also suppose, if we want, that the old
man has generously helped Jones in many ways during his life, and
that Jones feels deeply grateful to him for that. Jones now sees in
an especially clear way what strong and decisive moral reasons he has
for visiting his uncle. Afterwards, he meets Mary as in the original
story and, though he still feels strongly tempted by the prospect
of spending time with her, he now sees clearly that his reasons for
visiting his uncle are more important and decisive than his reasons
for staying with Mary. However, as he is a Z-person, he is, in fact,
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causally unable to do what a normal moral agent would rightly be
expected to do in the circumstances, namely, deciding to keep his
promise and visiting his uncle. Now, I would think that an agent who,
in a deliberative situation like this, is causally unable to make the right
moral decision, does not have a sound and unimpaired capacity for
practical reasoning and should not be judged to be (at any rate fully)
morally blameworthy for the decision he makes, no matter whether
one is a compatibilist or an incompatibilist.
Moreover, it would be pertinent to ask for more information about
the example, for, depending on how it is interpreted, there might
be additional reasons for criticism. In particular, it would be impor-
tant to know under what circumstances the nonrobust alternative of
Jones’s fainting is supposed to take place. Suppose that it may occur
at any time while Jones is deliberating and merely considering the
reasons for either decision. In this case, it seems that he does not have
enough control over his decision at T to break his promise. Though
he actually made that decision, he might equally have fainted in-
stead, so that the judgment that he is morally blameworthy for it is
eroded. On this interpretation, Widerker’s example is not immune to
traditional luck objections to incompatibilism. Suppose instead that
Jones would faint only as a result of his attending seriously to his moral
reasons and his making an effort to decide according to them. In this
case, Jones may be morally blameworthy for his decision to break his
promise, but now he has morally significant, robust alternatives. Jones
would therefore be blameworthy for his decision partly because he
should and could have made an effort to decide otherwise but did not.
On this interpretation, the example would not be a G-IRR-situation.
Similar remarks can be made with respect to Brain-Malfunction-W.
In this example, after neurological condition N has ceased to obtain,
Jones will not be able to decide according to his moral reasons, no
matter how strongly and decisively these reasons may appear to him.
But this causal impossibility of alignment between reasons and deci-
sion is a clear sign that something is going wrong with Jones’s delib-
erative and decision-making apparatus in that situation. It seems,
then, that Jones does not reach his decision to break his promise with
a sound and unimpaired capacity for practical and moral reasoning,
and this undermines the justification for judging him morally blame-
worthy for his decision. On the other hand, depending on what the
absence of condition N allowed Jones to do, the example might not
be a G-IRR situation. By hypothesis, this absence allows Jones to ap-
preciate the force of moral reasons. Suppose that it also allowed him
to adopt a favorable attitude toward complying with them, as a pre-
liminary step in the process of deciding to keep his promise. Even if
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the process could not finally be completed, adopting such an attitude
would seem to be a morally significant alternative, and the example
would not be a G-IRR-situation. Suppose, however, that the absence
of N did not even allow him to adopt a favorable attitude toward a
decision that would honor moral reasons, or to take any other pre-
liminary step addressed to that decision. If so, this would reinforce
our initial suspicion that, in the situation described in the example,
we were not facing an agent with unimpaired faculties for practical
deliberation. An agent unable to take any steps towards deciding ac-
cording to moral reasons, no matter how strong or convincing he
may find them, does not seem to be a normal deliberator, and the
case for not holding him (fully) morally responsible is enhanced.12
Though the possibility that Widerker, or someone else, can come
up with other cases of IRR-situations in which the agent is mor-
ally responsible for his decision cannot be ruled out a priori, there
are some general considerations, prompted by the preceding criti-
cisms, that suggest that such a possibility is not in the offing and even
that cases like it may not be possible. To conclude, let me argue for
this point.
An important advantage of Frankfurt scenarios is that they tend
to raise a natural and very strong intuition that, in them, the agent
is morally responsible for his decision, for this decision is, at least
apparently, ensured only by the presence of a purely counterfactual
factor, which remains fully inactive throughout the whole process.
The agent seems to deliberate and decide spontaneously, with no
apparent hindrance or constraint. Moreover, there is nothing that
prevents us from assuming that the agent’s actual apparatus of prac-
tical reasoning is perfectly sound and reasons-responsive. Suppose,
nonetheless, that Frankfurt scenarios fall prey to the dilemma objec-
tion or are otherwise irredeemably flawed.13 In Widerker’s alterna-
tive proposal, however, the intended result, namely either a morally
wrong decision or morally irrelevant alternatives, is not ensured by
a counterfactual factor (which would open the door to the dilemma
12 Though I will not develop this point here, I am confident that similar criticisms of
Widerker’s proposal can also be raised on the basis of other views of control and moral
responsibility, such as Frankfurt’s, Gary Watson’s, or Susan Wolf’s. It seems clear that,
in Widerker’s examples, and under quite plausible assumptions, Jones will not be able
to decide and act in accord with either his second-order volitions or his values.
13 Given the number, variety, and ingenuity of Frankfurt-friendly examples now on
offer, I am aware that this is a bold assumption indeed, but let us accept it for the sake
of argument. Some support for it can be found in my Moral Responsibility (chapter 2).
There I try to show that, even if some of the recently proposed examples can actually
escape the dilemma objection, they may face other, no less significant, difficulties.
comments and criticism 485
objection), but by some causal feature of the actual sequence and,
in particular, of the agent’s actual neurological and psychological
constitution. Now an agent who is internally (neurologically or psy-
chologically) unable to make the right moral decision, no matter how
strong and convincing the moral reasons he may have for that deci-
sion, does not seem to have a sound capacity for moral reasoning
and decision-making. And the problem is that, in these conditions,
and unlike what tends to happen in Frankfurt scenarios, the intui-
tion that the agent is morally blameworthy for his decision becomes
blurred or is simply absent. Whether this problem can be solved is
an open question, but, at first sight, solving it does not look like
an easy task. In this comment, I have tried to show that, at any rate,
Widerker’s purported examples of IRR-situations do not solve it.
carlos j. moya
University of Valencia
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